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THE EVALUATION OF CHILDREN'S IMPAIRMENTS IN
DETERMINING DISABILITY UNDER THE
SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME
PROGRAM
INTRODUCTION
In 1972, Congress amended the Social Security Act to provide for a
single federal assistance program.1 These amendments restructured the
disability insurance benefits program to provide nationwide uniformity in
eligibility requirements and benefit payments.2 Disability beneficiaries
now include children in low-income households who have impairments
of "comparable severity" to any impairment that would render an adult
disabled.3 The regulations, however, do not provide comparable means
of assessment to adults and children. An adult seeking benefits essen-
tially has two chances to prove the disability-either by demonstrating
an impairment listed in the regulations4 or through an individualized as-
sessment.5 A child claimant, however, must rely solely on the impair-
ments listed in the regulations and may not demonstrate disability
through an individualized assessment.6
Congress conferred on the Secretary of Health and Human Services7
(the "Secretary") the power to promulgate regulations to determine
whether a person, either an adult or a child, has an impairment or combi-
nation of impairments that would render the person "disabled" and,
thus, eligible for disability benefits.' When a statute directs the Secretary
to implement provisions by regulation, courts must give deference to the
regulations unless they exceed the Secretary's authority or are arbitrary
or capricious.' The Third Circuit recently struck down the regulations
1. See H.R. Rep. No. 231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 4989.
2. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1394 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1982).
4. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d) (1988). For a description of the listing of impair-
ments, see infra note 32 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
6. See Zebley ex rel. Zebley v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 67, 73 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. granted,
sub nom. Sullivan v. Zebley, 109 S. Ct. 2062 (1989).
7. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW") was created on
April 11, 1953. The Department of Education Organization Act, 20 U.S.C. § 3508
(1982), redesignated HEW as the Department of Health & Human Services ("HHS"),
effective May 4, 1980. See United States Government Manual 290 (1988).
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 1383(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
Congress has "conferred on the Secretary exceptionally broad authority to prescribe stan-
dards for applying certain sections of the [Social Security] Act." Heckler v. Campbell,
461 U.S. 458, 466 (1983) (quoting Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43 (1981)).
The Secretary has "full power and authority to make rules and regulations and to estab-
lish procedures, not inconsistent with the provisions of this subchapter, which are neces-
sary or appropriate to carry out such provisions." 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1982).
9. See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 466 (1983).
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as inconsistent with congressional intent because they make it harder for
children to prove that their impairments are disabling by not affording
children an individualized assessment of their impairments.' 0 Most cir-
cuits, however, have upheld the regulations as a valid exercise of the Sec-
retary's authority.11
This Note examines whether the Secretary's regulations are consistent
with the statutory mandate. Part I of this Note reviews the legislative
history surrounding the Social Security provisions which grant disability
benefits to children. This part also outlines the Secretary's regulations
for determining disabilities in adults and children. Part II analyzes the
Secretary's regulations and argues that the regulations are inconsistent
with the statutory mandate that every "disabled" person, whether an
adult or a child, is entitled to benefits.12 This Note concludes that the
regulations for children must permit an- individualized assessment to de-
termine whether their impairments are of "comparable severity" to any
impairments that render an adult disabled.
I. DISABILITY UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
A. Legislative History
Congress amended the Social Security Act13 to simplify and streamline
the unwieldy welfare system by introducing uniformity in eligibility re-
quirements and benefit payments. 14 By establishing this new federal pro-
gram for the aged, blind and disabled, Congress intended to provide
adequate assistance to those who, because of old age or disability, are
unable to support themselves. 5
The federal government provides benefits to disabled persons under
two distinct programs administered by the Social Security Administra-
tion ("SSA"). 16 The Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits Pro-
10. See Zebley, 855 F.2d at 73-74.
11. See, e.g., Burnside ex rel. Burnside v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 587, 590-91 (5th Cir.
1988) (noting that impaired children are evaluated only under the analysis for children
set out in the regulations); Hinckley ex rel. Martin v. Secretary of Health and Human
Servs., 742 F.2d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that the regulations for children consti-
tute a reasonable interpretation of the statutory definition of disability); Powell ex rel.
Powell v. Schweiker, 688 F.2d 1357, 1363 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (holding that the regulations
for children are not an abuse of discretion by the Secretary or inconsistent with the law).
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1982).
13. Until 1972, the Social Security Act provided for federal-state public assistance
programs. The state-operated social insurance programs inefficiently resulted in a multi-
plicity of requirements and benefit payments. See H.R. Rep. No. 231, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 147, reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4989, 5133.
14. See id. The new federally-administered system replaced the three state-adminis-
tered programs of assistance to the aged, blind and disabled, instituting "uniform require-
ments for such eligibility factors as the level and type of resources allowed and the degree
of disability or blindness." H.R. Rep. No. 231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in 1972
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4989, 4992.
15. See H.R. Rep. No. 231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 147-48, reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 4989, 5133.
16. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1394 (1982
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gram ("SSD") 7 grants benefits to physically and mentally disabled
individuals who have contributed to the disability insurance program.18
Because most children do not work and thus do not contribute to SSD,
they are not included in this program. 9 The Supplemental Security In-
come Program ("SSI")2° grants benefits to indigent disabled persons. 1
Before Congress restructured the SSA in 1972, disabled children were
not eligible for benefits under the federal-state program of welfare assist-
ance for the disabled. In the 1972 amendments, however, Congress spe-
cifically stated that poor, disabled children are especially deserving of
SSI.22 The House Report observed that "disabled children who live in
& Supp. IV 1986); see also Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 469-70 (1986)
(describing the two federal disability programs).
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
18. See id.
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
20. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1394 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
21. See Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470 (1986). The following provi-
sions of Title XVI of the Social Security Act define disability for both adults and children:
An individual shall be considered to be disabled for purposes of this sub-
chapter if he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of
any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be ex-
pected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than twelve months (or, in the case of a child
under the age of 18, if he suffers from any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment of comparable severity).
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1982).
For purposes of subparagraph (A), an individual shall be determined to be
under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are
of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind
of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy ....
Id. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
For purposes of this paragraph, a physical or mental impairment is an im-
pairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnor-
malities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques.
Id. § 1382c(a)(3)(C).
Both SSD and SSI define disability as an inability to engage in substantial gainful activ-
ity. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1982). This Note
focuses solely on SSI and the disparity of its disability evaluations for impaired adult and
child claimants.
SSI's definition includes impaired children. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1982).
An impaired child is considered disabled if he suffers from any "impairment of compara-
ble severity" to an impairment that renders an adult disabled. See id.
Indigent disabled children are included in the SSI program because Congress realized
that the needs of these doubly disadvantaged children are so great that they deserve spe-
cial assistance from the federal government. See H.R. Rep. No. 231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
147-48, reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4989, 5133-34.
22. See H.R. Rep. No. 231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 147-48, reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 4989, 5133-34. The amount of benefits given as supplemental
security income is based on need. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a) (1982). Thus, income and
other resources are taken into account when determining the amount of the award. See
Bormey v. Schweiker, 695 F.2d 164, 168 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1121 (1983);
Kollett v. Harris, 619 F.2d 134, 136 (1st Cir. 1980). Benefits are given only to the extent
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low-income households are certainly among the most disadvantaged of
all Americans and that they are deserving of special assistance in order to
help them become self-supporting members of our society."2 While
other federal welfare programs exist for disabled children, such as The
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 ("EAHCA"),24
and for non-disabled children of needy families, such as Aid To Families
With Dependent Children ("AFDC"),25 Congress considered such pro-
grams inadequate in providing for the extensive needs of disabled
children.26
B. The Evaluation Process
Under the Secretary's regulations, an adult claimant is evaluated
under a five-step sequential analysis to determine whether the claimant is
disabled and, thus, eligible for SSI benefits.27 Under the sequential analy-
sis, the SSA uses medical and vocational guidelines, known as the "Grid
System," to establish the claimant's ability to perform substantial gainful
activity.28 The grid system is bifurcated. If the disability falls into cer-
tain categories, the claimant is presumed to be disabled; if the disability
does not fall within an enumerated category, an adult claimant may be
deemed disabled after an individualized assessment of the disability. A
claimant who does not reach the requisite threshold at any step in the
the beneficiary's needs are not met from other sources, such as payments from other
agencies or payments from private pension plans. See H.R. Rep. No. 231, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 149-50, reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4989, 5135-36. This
need-based determination is applicable to both adults and children. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382(a) (1982); id. § 1382c(f)(2). In determining the eligibility of disabled children for
benefits, parents' income and resources are taken into consideration. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382c(f)(2) (1982); H.R. Rep. No. 231, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 148, reprinted in 1972 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 4989, 5134.
23. H.R. Rep. No. 231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 147-48, reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 4989, 5133-34.
24. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1485 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see also Note, Limitations
Period For Actions Brought Under § 1415 of The Education for All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975, 56 Fordham L. Rev. 725, 727-30 (1988) (describing the statutory scheme of
EAHCA). This program provides federal assistance to states that guarantee all handi-
capped children the right to a free public education. Id. at 725. Yet, because the
EAHCA provides funding for education of disabled children directly to the states, the
program does not lessen the need for SSI benefits, which are paid directly to the benefici-
ary, for disabled children of low-income families. SSI benefits are paid directly to the
disabled child's indigent family and are used for the special needs involved in caring for a
disabled child. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 147-48, reprinted
in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4989, 5133-34 (needs of disabled children are
greater than those of nondisabled children); infra note 68 (uses of SSI benefits).
25. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-676 (1982 & Supp. IV 1987).
26. See H.R. Rep. No. 231, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 148, reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 4989, 5134.
27. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1988); id. § 416.920; see, e.g., Bowen v. Yuckert, 482
U.S. 137, 140 (1987); Stone v. Heckler, 752 F.2d 1099, 1100-01 (5th Cir. 1985).
28. See Note, Social Security Disability Determinations: The Use and Abuse of the
Grid System, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 575 (1983).
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process is not considered disabled and is denied benefits.29
The first step of the process is designed to determine whether the
claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity.30 The sec-
ond step determines whether the claimant's impairment is severe, thereby
significantly limiting the claimant's ability to perform basic work related
activities.3" When the claimant's impairment is severe, the evaluation
proceeds to the third step to determine whether the impairment is one
specifically listed in the regulation or is its medical equivalent. 32 If a
claimant satisfies the first three steps of the five-step sequential analysis,
he is then entitled to a presumption of disability.33 The individualized
29. See Stone, 752 F.2d at 1102.
30. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b) (1988); id. § 416.920(b). If the claimant is currently
employed, then he is not disabled under the Act.
31. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) (1988); id. § 404.1521(a); id. § 416.920(c). Since age,
education and work experience are not considered at this step, see 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(c) (1988); id. § 416.920(c), this step does not provide the claimant with a
comprehensive individualized assessment of the claimant's actual functional capabilities.
The following standard is used "in determining whether a claimant's impairment is
severe: '[A]n impairment can be considered as not severe only if it is a slight abnormality
[having] such minimal effect on the individual that it would not be expected to interfere
with the individual's ability to work, irrespective of age, education or work experience.'"
Stone v. Heckler, 752 F.2d 1099, 1101 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting Brady v. Heckler, 724
F.2d 914, 920 (11th Cir. 1984)).
32. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d) (1988); id. § 416.920(d). Medical equivalence to a
listed impairment must be based on medical findings that show the impairment to be
equal in severity and duration to the listed findings. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926(a) (1988).
If the claimant is a child, then the listings include the supplemental listings, which are
designed to give consideration to the particular effects of the disease process in childhood.
See 20 C.F.R. § 416.925(b)(2) (1988). These listings are broken down into broad general
categories of impairments, according to body functions (e.g., Musculoskeletal System,
Special Senses and Speech, Respiratory System, Cardiovascular System, and so forth).
Within each category, impairments that are considered disabling are described in more
detail. See 20 C.F.R. § 404, subpt. P, app. 1 (1988). For example, in the Neurological
category in Part A, the listed disability of Cerebral Palsy is described as:
Cerebral Palsy. With:
A. IQ of 69 or less; or
B. Abnormal behavior patterns, such as destructiveness or emotional instabil-
ity:[sic] or
C. Significant interference in communication due to speech, hearing, or visual
defect; or
D. Disorganization of motor function as described in 11.04B
20 C.F.R. § 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 11.07 (1988).
33. See Burt v. Bowen, No. 85-1033, (E.D. Wash. May 12, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file); see also Zebley ex rel. Zebley v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 67, 73 (3d Cir. 1988),
cert. granted, sub nom. Sullivan v. Zebley, 109 S. Ct. 2062 (1989) (because the listings are
not an exhaustive compilation of medical conditions which impair functioning to the
extent necessary to find that a claimant is disabled, the listings merely entitle a claimant
to a presumption of disability).
The Supreme Court has recognized a presumption of disability inherent in the first
three steps of the sequential evaluation process. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 141
(1987). Noting that the Secretary decides more than two million claims for disability
each year, of which more than 200,000 are reviewed by Administrative Law Judges
("ALJ"), the Court recognized that steps two and three of the sequential analysis increase
efficiency and reliability by streamlining the decision process. The first three steps iden-
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evaluation undertaken at steps four and five occurs only when the im-
pairment is not presumed to be disabling.34
The fourth step determines whether the claimant's impairment pre-
vents him from engaging in past relevant work,35 which is any work the
claimant performed in the past fifteen years.3 6 Finally, in the fifth step,
the claimant's capabilities are individually assessed, with a full considera-
tion of claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"), age, education
and prior work experience.37
The individualized assessment of a claimant's actual functional capa-
bilities is designed to determine whether the claimant is able to engage in
any substantial gainful activity. For claimants who are not presump-
tively disabled, the individualized assessment is the most important as-
pect of the sequential evaluation process.3"
The regulations for determining disabilities of children differ from
those used for adults in that children are not entitled to an individualized
assessment if their impairments do not meet or equal the listed impair-
ments.39 Because children usually do not engage in substantial gainful
activity, in 1972 Congress provided for a comparative analysis in deter-
mining disabilities in children: a child will be considered disabled if his
impairments are of "comparable severity" to those impairments that
render an adult disabled.4° Thus, their sequential evaluation terminates
tify those claimants "whose medical impairments are so severe that it is likely they would
be found disabled regardless of their vocational background." Id. at 153 (emphasis ad-
ded); see also Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 471 (1986) ("If a claimant's
condition meets or equals the listed impairments, he is conclusively presumed to be dis-
abled and entitled to benefits.") (emphasis added).
34. See Burt, No. 85-1033, (E.D. Wash. May 12, 1988); see also Lewis v. Weinberger,
541 F.2d 417, 420 (4th Cir. 1976) (the listings are only a guide for a presumption of
disability but not an exclusive test to find disability).
35. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e) (1988); id. § 416.920(e).
36. See Note, supra note 28, at 590.
37. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f) (1988); id. § 416.920(f). These medical-vocational
guidelines are found in Appendix II of the regulations. The Grid takes administrative
notice of unskilled jobs in the national economy that constitute substantial gainful activ-
ity for various levels of exertional ability. See Note, supra note 28, at 587.
RFC measures the claimant's physical ability to perform various levels of work (seden-
tary, light, medium, heavy and very heavy), despite severe impairment. See id. at 588.
Age is relevant in determining claimant's ability to work competitively and adapt to new
work situations. See id. at 589. Education is taken into account by measuring the level of
formal schooling attained by the claimant. See id. Prior work experience is utilized to
determine whether the claimant has any vocationally relevant skills that can be trans-
ferred to other kinds of work. Any work done within the past fifteen years is considered
relevant. See id. at 590.
38. See Mental Health Association v. Schweiker, 554 F. Supp. 157, 159-60 (D. Minn.
1982), aff'd in part and modified in part, 720 F.2d 965 (8th Cir. 1983); see also Heckler v.
Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 467 (1983) (the disability statutory scheme contemplates an indi-
vidualized assessment of claimant's impairments); New York v. Bowen, 655 F. Supp. 136,
143 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (the evaluation of a claimant's impairments is an individualized,
case-by-case determination).
39. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924 (1988).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1982); 20 C.F.R. § 416.906 (1988).
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at step three.
The Secretary did, however, recognize the different effects certain dis-
eases have on children, and provided an additional listing of impairments
for use solely when the claimants for disability benefits are children.4 1
The criteria used here are designed to give appropriate consideration to
the particular effects of the disease process in children.42 Specifically, the
evaluation focuses on a child's activity, growth and development because
children are not expected to engage in work activity. Although there is
no consideration of a child's theoretical capacity to engage in work activ-
ity,4 3 the supplemental listings give consideration to functional limita-
tions caused by the impairments, as well as departures from
developmental norms.'
II. THE PROPER PROCESS OF EVALUATION FOR CHILDREN
A. The "Comparable Severity" Standard
In the 1972 amendments to the Social Security Act, Congress man-
dated that an impaired child should be considered "disabled" and, thus,
eligible for SSI benefits, if he "suffers from any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment of comparable severity"45 to an impair-
ment that would render an adult disabled.46 Pursuant to the congres-
sional directive to develop standards for finding disabilities in children,47
the Secretary set forth regulations for children that differ significantly
from the five-step sequential analysis used to determine disabilities in
41. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.925(b)(l)-(2) (1988). When evaluating disability for a child,
the additional listings are used first. If these medical criteria do not apply, then the list-
ings for adults are used. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.925(b)(2) (1988); see also 42 Fed. Reg.
14,705 (1977) (additional listings applicable only to evaluating a child's impairment
where regular listings do not give appropriate consideration to particular effect of disease
process in childhood).
42. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.925(b)(2) (1988). Thus, this listing of impairments is
designed to supplement the listings of impairments for adults. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,
subpt. P, app. 1 (1988).
43. See 42 Fed. Reg. 14,705, 14,706 (1977).
44. See id.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1982) (emphasis added).
46. When discussing the criteria to be developed by the Secretary in determining disa-
bilities in children, Senator Hathaway noted that the current definition of disability
should be implemented by standards that take into account both the medically determi-
nable physical or mental impairment and the comparable severity of the child's disability
in terms that are relevant to a child. See 122 Cong. Rec. 34,026 (1976).
Senator Hathaway (D. Maine), at the time a member of the Senate Committee on
Finance, Subcommittee on SSI, helped prepare the House Conference Report, see H.R.
Conf. Rep. No. 1745, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 5997, 6032, which discussed the Congressional direction for the Secretary
of HEW (now HHS) to publish criteria for determining disabilities in children, see id. at
24, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 6046.
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (this section adopts section
405(a), which gives the Secretary broad power to promulgate regulations for Social Se-
curity disability determinations.)
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adults.48
While the impact of a disability on an adult is examined in light of the
claimant's ability to engage in substantial gainful activity, the impact of a
disability on a child has a different focus. 49 A child's disability is evalu-
ated in terms of the "comparable severity" of its impact on the child's
ability to function successfully within age-appropriate expectations.5"
The Secretary did consider these factors in promulgating the supplemen-
tal listings. Yet these listings merely determine whether the claimant is
presumptively disabled. 1 Moreover, because the listings include only
the most severe impairments,52 it is "practically impossible" to qualify
under the supplemental listings. 3 The regulations do not afford children
the opportunity for an individualized assessment of their functional capa-
bilities.54 The Secretary, however, claims that the regulations inherently
contain a consideration of medical factors which relate to physical,
mental and emotional development 5 and, therefore, the child is provided
with the equivalent of an individualized assessment. 6
Significantly, Senator Hathaway noted, during debates on additional
amendments to SSI, that a child's vocational ability is irrelevant to the
disability determination.57 Moreover, the definition of disability in
adults, which is used to determine eligibility for SSI benefits, "relates to
employability ... a concept obviously irrelevant to children. ' 58 Senator
Hathaway argued that the test of comparable severity should be based on
criteria more relevant to a child's social, educational and physical devel-
opment, such as a consideration of the child's actual functional capacity
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1982); 20 C.F.R. § 416.906 (1988).
49. See 122 Cong. Rec. 34,025-26 (1976) (statement of Senator Hathaway).
50. See id. ("The child's functional capacity within the areas of learning, language,
self-help skills, mobility and social skills are decidedly more meaningful in determining
both the severity of the impairment and the developmental potential of the child.")
51. See Zebley ex rel. Zebley v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 67, 73 (3d Cir. 1988), cert, granted,
sub non. Sullivan v. Zebley, 109 S. Ct. 2062 (1989); supra note 33 and accompanying
text.
52. Dealing with a mentally impaired claimant, the court in Mental Health Associa-
tion v. Schweiker, 554 F. Supp. 157 (D. Minn. 1982), aff'd in part and modified in part,
720 F.2d 965 (8th Cir. 1983), noted that the listings include only the most severe psychi-
atric impairments. As such, it is difficult to meet or equal the listings. See id. at 162.
Thus, if a claimant meets this high threshold requirement based on the listings, the claim-
ant's disability may fairly and uniformly be presumed. See supra note 33 and accompa-
nying text.
53. Mental Health Association, 554 F. Supp. at 162; see also Burt v. Bowen, No. 85-
1033 (E.D. Wash. May 12, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) ("The vast majority
of awards for SSI benefits proceed beyond the third step.")
54. See Zebley, 855 F.2d at 73; Burt, No. 85-1033; 20 C.F.R. § 416.924 (1988).
55. See 42 Fed. Reg. 14,705, 14,705-06 (1977).
56. Indeed, certain developmental needs, such as counseling, special education, train-
ing, rehabilitation and guidance, are not considered by the regulations, because the Secre-
tary has concluded that these criteria are not within the scope of the law. See id. at
14,706.
57. See 122 Cong. Rec. 34,026 (1976) (statement of Senator Hathaway).
58. Id. at 33,301 (statement of Senator Bentsen).
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to engage in age-appropriate activities, as well as consideration of the
child's departure from normal development in both education and social
skills.5 9 In short, such an evaluation must be based on a realistic assess-
ment of the child's capacity to function in the world.6"
The courts that have upheld the regulations as entirely consistent with
the statutory mandate61 rely on the reasoning that the regulatory purpose
of the individualized assessment of adult claimants at steps four and five
is solely to assess a claimant's vocational limitations. These limitations
render the claimant qualified to receive SSI disability benefits because the
claimant is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity.62 Since chil-
dren do not work, these courts reason, the same vocational criteria
should not apply to their disability determinations. 63 Thus, the Secre-
tary's omission of an individual assessment of the actual functional capa-
bilities of impaired children constitutes a reasonable interpretation of a
statute that is primarily concerned with the ability of a claimant to en-
gage in substantial gainful activity." These courts further reason that
the SSA's interpretation of the statute should be accorded "great defer-
ence" 65 because it is the agency charged by Congress with implementing
the statutory mandate.
Although deference should be given to an administrative agency's in-
terpretation of a statute, the agency may not improperly exercise its au-
thority by promulgating regulations that are inconsistent with the intent
of Congress. 66 Congress was fully aware that children do not engage in
substantial gainful activity. Nevertheless, it deliberately included needy,
impaired children in the SSI program,67 provided their impairments are
of comparable severity to impairments which would render an adult dis-
abled. SSI disability benefits for children furnish low-income families
with the resources needed to care for and rehabilitate disabled children.68
59. See id. at 34,026 (statement of Senator Hathaway).
60. See Mental Health Association v. Schweiker, 554 F. Supp. 157, 168 (D. Minn.
1982), aff'd in part and modified in part, 720 F.2d 965 (8th Cir. 1983).
61. See Hinckley ex rel. Martin v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 742 F.2d 19,
23 (Ist Cir. 1984); Powell ex rel. Powell v. Schweiker, 688 F.2d 1357, 1363 (11th Cir.
1982).
62. See Hinckley, 742 F.2d at 23.
63. See id. at 22.
64. See id.; Powell, 688 F.2d at 1360.
65. Powell, 688 F.2d at 1361; see also Hinckley, 742 F.2d at 23 ("Nevertheless, the
fact that we are able to devise broader standards for measuring disabilities in children
does not permit us to strike down the reasonable standard promulgated by the Secretary
pursuant to her statutory authority.").
66. See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 466 (1983); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S.
137, 145 (1987) (quoting Heckler, 461 U.S. at 466).
67. See H.R. Rep. No. 231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 147-48, reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 4989, 5133-34.
68. SSI benefits are used "for special diets, for transportation to clinics, physicians
and rehabilitation facilities, for special services not covered by any medical assistance
program, for skilled child care" as well as other individual needs. Brief for the American
Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry as Amicus Curiae at 5, Zebley ex rel. Zeb-
ley v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1988) (No. 87-1692) (footnote omitted).
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Motivated by the extraordinary needs of indigent, disabled children,
Congress included these children in a statute which would otherwise not
apply to them. Regulations that restrict the ability of impaired children
to receive SSI benefits do not fully comply with Congress' policy of pro-
viding disabled children with SSI benefits. Therefore, the Secretary's reg-
ulations are not a reasonable interpretation of the statutory mandate and
are inconsistent with the intent of Congress.69
While the disability standards contemplated by Congress for children
need not conform exactly to the standards used for adults, Congress did
envision the use of comparable standards.70 Because a vast majority of
adult claims for SSI benefits proceed beyond the third stage of the disa-
bility analysis, 71 the regulations, in effect, require a child to have an im-
pairment of "greater severity" than an adult.72  The listings offer a
presumption of disability for obviously disabling impairments. Children
do not have the same opportunity as adults to prove that their less obvi-
ous impairments render them functionally disabled. The regulations,
therefore, mandate that a child reach the high threshold of presumptive
69. See Zebley ex rel. Zebley v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 67, 73-74 (3d Cir. 1988), cert.
granted, sub nom. Sullivan v. Zebley, 109 S. Ct. 2062 (1989).
70. "Of course, the Secretary must be mindful that 'the Social Security Act is a reme-
dial statute, to be broadly construed and liberally applied.'" Williams ex rel. Williams v.
Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 260 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Gold v. Secretary of Health, Educ. and
Welfare, 463 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1972)). Thus, the term "comparable severity" should
also be broadly and liberally construed, since the legislation is ameliorative and designed
to protect children.
71. See Burt v. Bowen, No. 85-1033 (E.D. Wash. May 12, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file) ("The vast majority of awards for SSI benefits proceed beyond the third
step. In the experience of this court, very few awards are granted because the claimant's
impairments meet or equal the listings.").
72. See id.
An impairment considered disabling for an adult on the basis of an individualized eval-
uation would probably not result in a finding of a "disability" in the case of a child. A
good example of this incongruity can be found in Wills v. Secretary of Health & Human
Services, 686 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Mich. 1987). While still a minor, the claimant sought
disability benefits based on impairments resulting from Ornithine Transcarbamylase Syn-
drome, a disease in which a rare genetic enzyme is deficient in the claimant's liver. As a
result of this condition, claimant suffered brain damage, which caused mild retardation,
central nervous system defects, and learning and behavioral defects. The child was de-
nied benefits by the SSA because her defects did not meet or equal the listing of impair-
ments. By the time her childhood disability claim reached the district court, the claimant
was nineteen years old. In adjudicating the claim for benefits that the claimant should
have received as a minor, the court noted that, in the meantime, the claimant was given
social security benefits as an adult upon her 18th birthday. See id. at 172 n. 1. Ironically,
the claimant's impairments, which did not meet the threshold presumption of disability
because they did not meet or equal the listings when the claimant was a minor, suddenly
became disabling when the claimant legally became an adult and was afforded a more
extensive evaluation of her actual functional limitations in which she was deemed incapa-
ble of work. See id. at 176. Such a situation exemplifies the inequity of the different
standards applied to adults and children. The presumption of disability, based upon the
listings as the sole standard for an impaired child, is a more restrictive and stringent test
than that applied to adults. See Burt v. Bowen, No. 85-1033 (E.D. Wash. May 12, 1988)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). A congressional mandate for a standard of compara-
ble severity can never be adequately satisfied under such inequitable standards.
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disability before that child will be considered disabled, even if a compara-
ble impairment in an adult would render the adult disabled.73
In Hinckley ex rel. Martin v. Secretary of Health & Human Services,7 4
the First Circuit reasoned that because an individualized assessment of
adults involved an evaluation of vocational factors for the purpose of
determining ability to engage in substantial gainful activity, this identical
assessment was obviously inapplicable to children who do not work even
if they are not impaired." Such non-medical, vocational criteria cannot
be applied to children.76 While the court in Hinckley recognized that
identical standards could not apply to both adults and children,77 it ac-
cepted a more restrictive standard-one that restricted a child's disability
determination to the first three steps.
While the standards used in the first three steps of the sequential anal-
ysis are identical for adults and children, the process as a whole does not
73. Without an individualized assessment, children with impairments that do not
reach the presumptive level of disability in the listings cannot qualify for disability bene-
fits based on their actual degree of functional impairment. Indeed, although poor chil-
dren with disabilities have been estimated to number between 435,000 and 1.3 million, see
Brief for the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry as Amicus Curiae
at 10, Zebley ex rel. Zebley v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1988) (No. 87-1692) (citing P.
Breen, Participation of Disabled Children In The Supplemental Security Income Program,
unpublished report, Bush Institute for Child and Family Policy, University of North
Carolina, Chapel Hill (1980)), as of 1986 the Secretary had determined that only 280,137
children were eligible for SSI benefits. See 1987 Annual Statistical Supplemental, Soc.
Sec. Bull. 283 (table 200).
74. 742 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1984).
75. See id. at 22; see also Williams ex rel. Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 260 (2d
Cir. 1988) (comparable severity suggests that adults and children cannot be judged by
identical standards).
In upholding the Secretary's regulations for impaired children in Powell ex rel. Powell
v. Schweiker, 688 F.2d 1357, 1363 (1lth Cir. 1982), the Eleventh Circuit noted that the
Secretary satisfied the Congressional mandate for comparability by providing identical
standards for adults and children in three important ways. First, both adults and chil-
dren are considered disabled if their impairments are listed in appendix I, part A. Sec-
ond, both adults and children are considered disabled if their impairments are the
equivalent of the listings in part A. Third, both adults and children must meet the dura-
tional requirement of 12 months. Id. at 1360. The court noted that the Secretary went
even further for impaired children by providing an additional listing of impairments for
children. See id.
In a recent case dealing with the denial of benefits to a child with sickle thalassemia, an
illness related to sickle cell anemia, the Eighth Circuit declined to decide whether the
regulations as a whole are valid, yet determined that the regulations, as applied in the
case before the court, were not invalid. See Nash ex rel. Alexander v. Bowen, 882 F.2d
1291, 1293 (8th Cir. 1989). The court stated that the statute did not require the Secretary
to determine whether a child had the functional capacity to perform substantial gainful
activity, since such an inquiry would be highly speculative. See id. Also, the court found
that the child claimant in this case was afforded an individual assessment of his impair-
ment, because "the listing for childhood sickle cell anemia differs greatly from the listing
for adult sickle cell anemia and appears to provide for a finding of disability in a broader
range of cases." Id. (citations omitted).
76. See Hinckley, 742 F.2d at 23. But see J. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice 114 (1983)
(statutory definition of disability is concerned with capacity, not just employability).
77. See Hinckley, 742 F.2d at 22.
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provide children with an adequate opportunity to prove comparable se-
verity. The supplemental listings available to assess children's impair-
ments do not adequately substitute for individualized assessments
because they require a threshold level that constitutes a presumption of
disability. Individual evaluation for children would, of course, focus on
different aspects from those considered in adult assessments. For exam-
ple, it would take into account the impact of the child's impairment on
his ability to function successfully within age-appropriate expectations,
as well as the impact on the child's future development.78
Moreover, consideration of these factors will enable the Social Security
Administration to determine the actual level of need for rehabilitative
services or special education in order to make these children productive
members of society,79 which is the very purpose of Social Security bene-
fits for children. Thus, individualized assessments are necessary for chil-
dren.80 In Zebley ex rel. Zebley v. Bowen,"1 the Third Circuit correctly
held that by denying children an individualized assessment of their actual
functional capacity resulting from their impairments, the regulations
promulgated by the Secretary conflict with the intent of Congress.8 2
Since present disability may limit future vocational capacity, an indi-
vidualized assessment of the child's impairments allows a prognosis of
the future impact of the disability on employment.8 3 In addition, the
Secretary may properly consider whether the child has impairments that
would prevent an adult from working.8
4
78. See 122 Cong. Rec. 34,026 (1976) (statement of Sen. Hathaway describing the
proper criteria for disability determinations in children); see also Baxter v. Schweiker, 538
F. Supp. 343, 351 (N.D. Ga. 1982) ("The mere presence of medical problems does not
constitute disability; there must also be disabling effects.")
An individualized assessment of the child's RFC, age and education and its impact on
his growth, learning and development is necessary to evaluate and uncover impairments
of "comparable severity" to an impairment that would render an adult disabled. An
adult claimant is considered disabled when the claimant is unable to engage in substantial
gainful activity. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
79. See 122 Cong. Rec. 34,026 (1976) ("[A] child may have a severe medical disabil-
ity which may, in childhood, be able to be brought under control through proper treat-
ment .... If there is no intervention at this stage, and needed services are not provided
that child, then he may well not be able to develop the skills needed to become a produc-
tive adult .... [T]he cycle of disability, failure to develop to potential, and a future of
welfare dependency may never be broken." (statement of Senator Hathaway)). Thus,
developmental needs of impaired children must be considered in determining whether
they are disabled and in need of benefits.
80. See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 467 (1983); New York v. Bowen, 655 F.
Supp. 136, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
81. 855 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. granted, sub nom. Sullivan v. Zebley, 109 S. Ct.
2062 (1989).
82. See id. at 76.
83. See 122 Cong. Rec. 34,026 (statement of Senator Hathaway). Contra Smith v.
Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 656 F. Supp. 954, 956 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (inquiry
into an impaired child's future ability to engage in gainful activity inappropriate).
84. See Wills v. Secretary of Health & Human. Servs., 686 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Mich.
1987).
Ironically, the Social Security Administration used this assessment in Thompson ex
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B. Comparison With Widow's Disability Benefits
One argument the courts have used for not allowing individual assess-
ments for children relies on a comparable provision for disability entitle-
ments for widows and widowers. In determining the eligibility of
dependent widows and widowers for disability benefits, the Secretary's
regulations require that the widow's impairments meet or equal a listed
impairment.85 The Secretary,86 under Congressional authority, promul-
gated these regulations to establish the severity of impairments which
would preclude an individual from engaging in substantial gainful activ-
ity.87 The test used to determine disabilities of widows "would be based
solely on the level of severity of the impairment," and does not permit
individualized assessment of factors such as age, education and work ex-
perience. 8 This is the same criterion employed for children seeking disa-
bility benefits,8 9 although children are evaluated under two different
listings. 90
In 1977 the Senate Finance Committee Staff reported the publication
of the regulations relating to disabilities in children. The report noted
that the non-medical vocational factors were not applied to disabled chil-
rel. Thompson v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 559 F. Supp. 548, 551 (E.D.N.Y.
1983), when an ALJ denied disability benefits to a child claimant based on the determina-
tion that the claimant's impairments did not meet or equal the listings, as well as the fact
that the claimant could work if he was an adult. See id. at 551; see also Weir ex rel. Weir
v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 955, 963 n.7 (3d Cir. 1985) (consideration of child's capacity to
work, if an adult, useful). The court remanded the case to the ALI for a new hearing, in
which there would be further consideration of whether the claimant's impairments were
equivalent to a listed impairment. If not, the court directed the Secretary to reconsider
the question of whether the child could work if he was an adult. See Thompson, 559 F.
Supp. at 552. Such an individualized consideration would include the child's exertional
capacity to perform sedentary work, but also any other environmental restrictions and
nonexertional impairments (such as the child's ability to climb stairs and use mass
transit) that would prevent the child from engaging in substantial gainful activity if he
were an adult. See id. at 551-52.
Another variation on the determination of comparability was utilized by the court in
Winfield v. Mathews, 571 F.2d 164 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 869 (1978). The
Third Circuit upheld a denial of disability benefits to a 5 year old who suffered from a
congenital eye defect, because no Social Security Administration physician had con-
cluded that the child's eye impairment was equivalent or "comparably severe" to the
listings of impairments. See id. at 169-70. Thus, the court viewed comparability as a
determination of the severity of the child's condition. No consideration, however, was
given to whether the child could work if he were an adult.
85. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1578(a)(1) (1988).
86. At that time, the Secretary's title was Secretary of Health Education & Welfare.
Now, however, the Secretary's title has changed to Secretary of Health & Human Serv-
ices. See supra note 4.
87. See S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 50, reprinted in 1967 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 2834, 2883.
88. S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 50, reprinted in 1967 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 2834, 2883.
89. See Hinckley ex rel. Martin v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 742 F.2d 19,
22 (1st Cir. 1984); Powell ex rel. Powell v. Schweiker, 688 F.2d 1357, 1361 (11th Cir.
1982); 20 C.F.R. § 416.924 (1988).
90. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.925(b)(l)-(2) (1988).
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dren for the same reasons they had not been applied to disabled wid-
ows.91 For example, as a group, both children and widows do not have
enough attachment to the labor force to make application of vocational
factors feasible.92 However, this explanation is not conclusive on the
matter. The finance committee report was written five years after the
statute entitling disabled children to SSI benefits was enacted, and "post-
enactment comment by a legislative committee generally does not serve
as a reliable indicator of congressional intent."93 Further, even if the
report does indicate congressional approval of the Secretary's failure to
use vocational factors in determining disabilities in children, the Secre-
tary still must utilize criteria comparable to vocational factors for
adults. 94
In contrast to the express congressional directive for disability deter-
minations in widows, Congress never instructed the Secretary to restrict
the criteria for determining disabilities in children to the level of severity
of their impairments. Rather, Congress provided that a child be deemed
disabled if he suffers from any impairment of "comparable severity" to
an impairment that would render an adult disabled.95 Therefore, Con-
gress did not preclude an individualized assessment of functional capabil-
ities in children as it did in disability determinations of widows and
widowers.
In addition, in Tolany v. Heckler,96 the Second Circuit held that even
in disability determinations for widows, there should still be a considera-
tion of the claimant's Residual Functional Capacity.97 The court noted
that the regulations were ambiguous concerning the extent to which the
regulations required consideration of a widow's RFC.98 Thus, the court
recognized that even for widows, there must be some individualized as-
sessment of actual capacity to engage in gainful activity. This important
recognition was made in spite of the fact that Congress sought to restrict
widows from an assessment of non-medical factors.
CONCLUSION
Congress has provided for a disability program in which poor, im-
paired children will be deemed eligible for SSI disability benefits if their
91. Staff of Senate Comm. on Finance, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., The Supplemental Se-
curity Income Program 125 (Comm. Print 1977).
92. See id.
93. Zebley ex rel. Zebley v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 67, 75 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. granted, sub
nom. Sullivan v. Zebley, 109 S. Ct. 2062 (1989). But see Hinckley ex reL Martin v. Secre-
tary of Health & Human Servs., 742 F.2d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 1984) (neither widows nor
children have enough attachment to the labor force to utilize vocational factors); Powell
ex rel. Powell v. Schweiker, 688 F.2d 1357, 1362 (11th Cir. 1982) (same).
94. Zebley, 855 F.2d at 75 (emphasis in original).
95. See Zebley, 855 F.2d at 75; 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1982).
96. 756 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1985).
97. See id. at 271.
98. See id. ("The special procedure for widows does not mention residual functional
capacity, but this does not necessarily mean it may be ignored.")
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impairments are of "comparable severity" to those impairments that
render adults disabled. The Secretary, however, has promulgated differ-
ent criteria to be used in determining disabilities in impaired adults and
children. If a child's impairment does not meet the high threshold of
presumptive disability, the child is not afforded the same individualized
assessment of actual functional capabilities as adult claimants receive and
the child's claim for benefits is denied.
These regulations are inconsistent with the congressional mandate for
determining disabilities in impaired children. Thus, the Secretary has
not exercised his delegated authority in accordance with congressional
intent. The regulations must, therefore, be amended to provide for an
individualized assessment of a child claimant's impairments to comport
with the Social Security Act.
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